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Abstract
RC4 is a stream cipher included in the TLS protocol,
and widely used for encrypting network traffic during the
last decades. Spritz is a possible candidate for replacing
RC4. Spritz is based on a sponge construction and pre-
serves the byte-oriented behaviour existing in RC4, but
introduces an interface that provides encryption, hash-
ing or MAC-generation functionalities.
We present here the results obtained after applying
several statistical tests on the keystreams generated by
Spritz when used in the cipher mode. Our methodology
makes use of 1024 keystreams of 225 bits. The algorithm
was tested against the DieHarder test suite. None of
the tests failed. Few tests produced weak results that
were corrected when the number of samples increased.
Keywords: Spritz, RC4, stream cipher, Dieharder,
NIST Statistical Test Suite.
1 Introduction
Symmetric-key cryptography contains two fundamental
classes of cryptographic algorithms: block ciphers and
stream ciphers. During the past decade, symmetric
block ciphers were intensively studied through the AES-
election contest organized by NIST. The winning algo-
rithm is considered secure and has been successfully used
in practice. On the other hand, less attention was dedi-
cated to the analysis of stream ciphers. The last contest
organized by NIST targeted a different set of crypto-
graphic primitives: hash functions.
Stream ciphers are used in encrypting mobile com-
munications as well as network traffic. Many exist-
ing algorithms follow a design of simplicity to favour
speed. The only information-theoretically secure cipher,
the One Time Pad cipher (OTP), serves as an inspi-
rational model for most stream ciphers: the ciphertext
is the result of XOR-ing the plain-text with a random
key. Since the OTP is impractical due to the necessary
length of the key, various approaches are used by stream
ciphers to extend a short key to possibly infinitely long
keystreams that are applied to the plain-text.
RC4 is one of the stream ciphers included into the SSL
and TLS cipher suites for encrypting Internet traffic, and
according to many sources [2, 3], RC4 is one of the most
popular choices. Designed in 1987, it was subject to
many theoretical and practical attacks; a new proposal
to replace RC4 was made by Rivest and Schuldt in 2014
- Spritz [1]. The proposed stream cipher is based on a
sponge construction, but inherits from the byte-oriented
design of RC4.
1.1 Motivation
Few analysis of the algorithm exist [4]. Here we inves-
tigate a preliminary aspect of Spritz, the randomness
of the keystreams that are generated, independently by
the tests that were used by the architects. In general, a
suspect result obtained when testing the randomness of
the output generated by a stream cipher or a hash func-
tion does not imply the existence of an easily exploitable
structural weakness. However, this may jeopardize the
chances of the algorithm to be adopted as a standard.
2 Specification of Spritz
As described by its authors in [1], Spritz is constructed
having in mind the benefits offered by sponge functions
[5]. The result is an algorithm that can be used both
as a message authentication code, random bit generator
or a hash function. However, the primary intention is
to use the algorithm and relevant interfaces as a stream
cipher.
Spritz follows the standard approach, where the key
is extended and added to the plain-text in order to ob-
tain the cipher-text. A state of the algorithm consists
of the values of six registers i, j, k, w, z, a and the per-
mutation S of {0, 1, .., N − 1}. The default size of S is
N = 256. As for sponge constructs, the output is gener-
ated by a Squeeze procedure, which repeatedly calls a
pseudo-random function - Drip - that updates the state
(changes the values of i, j, k registers and acts on the
permutation S) in order to output a byte. When used
as a stream cipher, the key is firstly absorbed into the
state through blocks of ’nibbles’ (half bytes) and exe-
cuting a Shuffle procedure after each absorption. The
functionality behind this procedure is aimed to random-
ize the state. Shuffle calls specific procedures that act
on the state of the algorithm.
The byte-oriented design the algorithm has the disad-
vantage of generating the output slower than other word-
oriented algorithms, as remarked in [1]. Also, Spritz
used in hash mode is slower than the recently elected
SHA-3. 1
1The width of the permutation in SHA-3’s winning proposal
is proportional to the size of the word, thus easily adaptable for
different architectures.
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2 Specification of Spritz
The pseudocode of the algorithm [1] and the interface
for using it as a stream cipher are provided below:
InitializeState(N)
1: i = j = k = z = a = 0
2: w = 1
3: for v = 0 to N − 1 do
4: S[v] = v
5: end for
Shuffle()
1: Whip(2N)
2: Crush()
3: Whip(2N)
4: Crush()
5: Whip(2N)
6: a = 0
Whip(r)
1: for v = 0 to r − 1 do
2: Update()
3: end for
4: w = w+1
5: do w = w+1
6: until GCD(w,N) = 1
Crush()
1: for v = 0 to ⌊N/2⌋ − 1 do
2: if S[v] > S[N − 1− v] then
3: Swap(S[v], S[N − 1− v])
4: end if
5: end for
Squeeze(r)
1: if a > 0 then
2: Shuffle()
3: end if
4: P = Array.New(r)
5: for v = 0 to r − 1 do
6: P [v] = Drip()
7: end for
8: return P
Drip()
1: if a > 0 then
2: Shuffle()
3: end if
4: Update()
5: return Output()
Update()
1: i = i+ w
2: j = k + S[j + S[i]]
3: k = i+ k + S[j]
4: Swap(S[i], S[j])
Output()
1: z = S[j + S[i+ S[z + k]]]
2: return z
Absorb(I)
1: for v = 0 to I.length− 1 do
2: AbsorbByte(I[v])
3: end for
AbsorbByte(b)
1: AbsorbNibble(LOW(b))
2: AbsorbNibble(HIGH(b))
AbsorbNibble(x)
1: if a = ⌊N/2⌋ then
2: Shuffle()
3: end if
4: Swap(S[a], S[⌊N/2⌋+ x])
5: a = a+ 1
AbsorbStop()
1: if a = ⌊N/2⌋ then
2: Shuffle()
3: end if
4: a = a+ 1
The following functions use the sponge to provide
hashing, encryption or decryption functionalities.
Encrypt(K,M)
1: KeySetup(K)
2: C = M+ Squeeze(M.length)
3: return C
Decrypt(K,C)
1: KeySetup(K)
2: M = C− Squeeze(C.length)
3: return M
Hash(M, r)
1: InitializeState()
2: Absorb(M)
3: AbsorbStop()
4: Absorb(r)
5: return Squeeze(r)
EncryptWithIV(K, IV,M)
1: KeySetup(K)
2: AbsorbStop()
3: Absorb(IV )
4: C = M+ Squeeze(M.length)
5: return C
KeySetup(K)
1: InitializeState()
2: Absorb(K)
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3.2 Tests used in the statistical analysis
3 Statistical testing of output
generated by Spritz
According to [1, 4], the algorithmwent through extensive
statistical testing. The design rationale is detailed in the
specification (including the possible candidates and the
choices made for Update and Output). However, the
results of the statistical randomness tests applied on the
keystreams generated by Spritz were not included in the
paper. The randomness of the output is a key feature
every stream cipher must have; thus we expect Spritz
to pass all tests, and confirm the claims made by the
authors. In this section, we present the methodology
and the results obtained by inspecting the keystreams
using the DieHarder suite [6].
3.1 Methodology
Spritz was used in the stream-cipher mode. In order
to obtain the output for feeding DieHarder, we initially
generated the keystreams needed by the Encrypt proce-
dure (without initial values). We used randomly gener-
ated keys of 32 bytes length. The size of the permuta-
tion was 256 bytes (default value). The data generated
consisted of 1024 keystreams of 225 bits. The test envi-
ronment used was a Linux AMI micro-instance, available
from Amazon Web Services.
We motivate our choice for using the DieHarder test
suite, due to the fact that it includes most of the tests
existing in NIST’s Statistical Test Suite [7] and the
DieHard battery of tests [8]. Also, the test suite allows
to keep testing the data until a result is reached with
high confidence.
3.2 Tests used in the statistical analysis
DieHarder is a comprehensive tool in terms of the
statistical tests that are incorporated. The recent
versions fully include the NIST suite consisting of tests
for measuring the frequency, block frequency, entropy,
runs, matrix rank, longest run, overlapping or non- over-
lapping template matchings, linear complexity, serial
cumulative sums, random excursions and variants. We
do not provide the description of these tests. However
we provide the description of particular tests from the
DieHarder randomness battery that revealed a weak
behaviour for smaller number of samples: the Monobit,
Serial, RGB Bit Distibution and RGB Permutation
tests:
The Monobit Test
“Counts the 1 bits in a long string of random
uints. Compares to expected number, gener-
ates a p-value directly from erfc(). Very effec-
tive at revealing overtly weak generators; Not
so good at determining where stronger ones
eventually fail.” [6]
Table 1: Results for 1024 keystreams of length 225.
Test Name tuple psample p-value Result
diehard birthdays 0 100 0.63054096 Passed
diehard operm5 0 100 0.1282933 Passed
diehard rank˙32x32 0 100 0.41084472 Passed
diehard rank˙6x8 0 100 0.29555723 Passed
diehard bitstream 0 100 0.22681182 Passed
diehard opso 0 100 0.95338252 Passed
diehard oqso 0 100 0.08739302 Passed
diehard dna 0 100 0.88528270 Passed
diehard count 1s str 0 100 0.17277707 Passed
diehard count 1s byt 0 100 0.68141261 Passed
diehard parking lot 0 100 0.08478625 Passed
diehard 2d sphere 2 100 0.81343673 Passed
diehard 3d sphere 3 100 0.84124724 Passed
diehard squeeze 0 100 0.59072752 Passed
diehard sums 0 100 0.24236920 Passed
sts monobit 0 100 0.99792691 Weak
sts monobit 0 200 0.76653420 Passed
sts runs 0 100 0.97730946 Passed
sts serial 1 100 0.99792691 Weak
sts serial 2 100 0.89538406 Passed
sts serial 3 100 0.62255692 Passed
sts serial 3 100 0.97791641 Passed
sts serial 4 100 0.98491218 Passed
sts serial 4 100 0.72518227 Passed
rgb bitdist 1 100 0.97541932 Passed
rgb bitdist 2 100 0.99908738 Weak
rgb bitdist 2 200 0.99908738 Passed
rgb bitdist 3 100 0.60061288 Passed
rgb bitdist 4 100 0.95070961 Passed
rgb bitdist 5 100 0.970557854 Passed
rgb permutations 2 100 0.99583035 Weak
rgb permutations 2 200 0.49210341 Passed
rgb permutations 3 100 0.34685706 Passed
rgb permutations 4 100 0.10607070 Passed
rgb permutations 5 100 0.47826848 Passed
rgb lagged sum 0 100 0.48016287 Passed
rgb lagged sum 1 100 0.05039327 Passed
rgb lagged sum 2 100 0.10018457 Passed
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The Serial Test
“Accumulates the frequencies of overlapping n-
tuples of bits drawn from a source of random in-
tegers. The expected distribution of n-bit pat-
terns is multinomial with p = 2−n e.g. the four
2-bit patterns 00 01 10 11 should occur with
equal probability.” [6]
The RGB Bit Distribution Test
“Accumulates the frequencies of all n-tuples
of bits in a list of random integers and com-
pares the distribution thus generated with
the theoretical (binomial) histogram, form-
ing chisq and the associated p-value. In
this test n-tuples are selected without over-
lap (e.g. 01—10—10—01—11—00—01—10)
so the samples are independent.” [6]
The RGB Permutation Test
“This is a non-overlapping test that simply
counts order permutations of random numbers,
pulled out n at a time. There are n! permu-
tations and all are equally likely. The samples
are independent, so one can do a simple chisq
test on the count vector with n! - 1 degrees of
freedom.” [6]
3.3 Results
The results obtained after running the DieHarder tests
confirm the claims of the specification of the algorithm.
The p-values obtained from the tests were all greater
than 0.99, except for the Monobit, Serial, RGB Bit Dis-
tribution and RGB Permutation tests. When the num-
ber of p-samples was increased to 200, the previous tests
passed.
Also, a close to 0.01 value was identified for several
other tests. To improve the accuracy of the results a
larger amount of data may be needed and the number
of p-samples may be increased as well.
4 Conclusion
This report investigates the randomness of the output
generated by Spritz through statistical means. We ap-
plied the DieHarder test battery over a set of keystreams
produced by the algorithm. The results do not indi-
cate any failure of a randomness statistical test. Sus-
pect p-values are observed for few tests. This behaviour
is completely eliminated when DieHarder increases the
number of samples and repeats the tests - a fact confirms
the initial expectations - no non-random behaviour was
observed in Spritz.
4.1 Future Work
Spritz is an interesting framework, given the large range
of possible applications. As mentioned in the proposal,
additional investigations are needed for Spritz operating
as a hash function, deterministic random bit generator
or message authentication code provider. A future in-
vestigation can analyze the algorithm statistically and
structurally when used in these modes.
Other improvements can be summarized in testing
larger input files or using different statistical tests, that
are not available in DieHarder. Many of these tests may
be performed in a parallel way. An existing work [9]
provides a testing methodology for hash functions. In
future, this can be used to investigate the randomness
of Spritz when used in the hash mode.
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